Starlink’s success in keeping Ukraine connected during the war with Russia represented a wake-up call. As American companies conquer low-Earth orbit (LEO), European policymakers have become concerned about relying on a single foreign supplier.
The European Commission has responded by proposing an EU Space Act, which aims to replace the current “patchwork” of 13 different national space laws with a single European space regulation. New environmental and safety regulations would apply to American companies providing space-based services (such as satellite communications or earth observation) that reach European consumers.
The space initiative has sparked a new transatlantic conflict. Washington says the Space Act risks imposing “unacceptable regulatory burdens,” and Brendan Carr, chairman of America’s Federal Communications Commission, threatens to restrict European operators from the US market if the EU favors its own companies.
In practice, the Act’s most onerous obligations will apply only to large American companies, starting with Starlink. The EU Space Act’s “discriminatory provisions” represent “nontariff barriers in trade negotiations,” contend Kristian Stout and Eric Fruits of the Portland-based International Center for Law and Economics.
Although the Space Act remains under negotiation in both the European Parliament and the European Council, and is unlikely to be passed before 2028, European leaders are moving ahead. Space has become a key element in the global struggle for security, French President Emmanuel Macron said when announcing new investments in lasers, electromagnetic jammers, and other patrol satellites. Germany is investing €35 billion in space security for 2026-2030, and Spain is committing €1.8 billion to the European Space Agency, while also advancing projects like the SpainSat NG secure communications satellites.
Under the Space Act, space firms would have to submit rigorous launch safety and end-of-life disposal plans to ensure satellites are brought back to earth or moved to graveyard orbits. Strict limits are placed on space debris, light, and radio-frequency pollution. European Parliamentarian Christophe Grudler says the new regulations are needed to create orbital “traffic rules.”
New safety standards are also envisioned. Both EU-based and third-country companies must conduct risk assessments and implement cybersecurity and physical resilience measures. As part of the sustainability measures, companies would be required to mitigate debris, subscribe to collision avoidance services, and design satellites to reduce light and radio pollution. Failure to comply risks fines up to 2% of total global annual turnover.
For Washington, these new regulations risk discriminating against American companies. The proposal differentiates between “mega-constellations” (100-999 satellites) and “giga-constellations” (1,000+), which face strict obligations that potentially apply only to US companies like Starlink today and Amazon’s Leo in the near future. Giga-constellations must demonstrate sufficient fuel to steer satellites and avoid collisions. The EU’s Galileo (32 satellites) and IRIS² (290) remain outside the scope.
In the European Parliament, the debate has become heated. Far-right Italian lawmaker Elena Donazzan, wants to allow non-European operators to do business more freely, while Greens negotiator Sergey Lagodinsky wants to keep the strict rules on US companies.
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As with many European regulations, enforcement looks problematic. While the EU’s Agency for the Space Programme will gain new authority to authorize space activities across the 27 EU members, each government must enforce these rules. Previous experience with privacy legislation shows that each country interprets and enforces European regulations differently.
Another potentially problematic issue is an exemption for satellites used for military, intelligence, or “other essential State functions.” Governments could classify civil projects as military simply to bypass the Space Act’s heavy environmental and regulatory burdens, argues Jasper Tretow of the Stanford University Space Law Society.
By itself, the Space Act will do little to close Europe’s space capability gap. Starlink enjoys a wide lead over European competitors, such as Eutelsat’s OneWeb. It boasts an expanding constellation of more than 7,000 LEO satellites, giving it unmatched reception. Its economies of scale allow for unrivalled low prices: a single OneWeb terminal costs an estimated €9,000 compared to approximately €500 for Starlink. Finally, Starlink terminals are small and portable; alternative solutions remain bulky and complex.
Instead of catching up, European competitors risk falling further behind. The EU’s IRIS² project, a 290-satellite constellation, will not see full operations until 2030 (with partial operations in 2028). EU GOVSATCOM provides secure satellite communications for governments and public authorities, mainly for high-level coordination rather than everyday battlefield use.
If competition for Starlink emerges, it looks like it will be non-European. US companies led by Amazon and Google, and startups such as Axiom Space, are racing to build space-based data centers that will host AI and cloud infrastructure in orbit. China’s state-owned CASC has announced a five-year plan to develop its own space-based data centers.
Even as it promotes competitiveness, Brussels’s space adventure shows that it hopes to become the global rule-setter by applying its standards to foreign operators. Like GDPR privacy rules, the Space Act could shape international norms by setting enforceable rules in a field still largely ungoverned. Europe’s future orbit looks clean, well-regulated — but dominated by American and Chinese companies.
Federico Borsari is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Maria-Doriana Gheorghe is an intern with the Tech Policy program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. She is completing a master’s in international governance and diplomacy at Sciences Po in Paris.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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