If the skeptics and bots here want to talk about evidence, let’s talk about the evidence. Not the hearsay. Not the speculation. Not that same lame old performative skepticism that arrives here en masse any time a primary source gets too inconvenient. Just the government’s own raw paper trail, written in real time by the men who were actually building the early Cold War machinery. Let’s start with Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter’s official 1947 diary: the contemporaneous, day-by-day log of the Director of Central Intelligence who later appears as MJ-1 in the Eisenhower Briefing Document. This is not more Rick Doty malarkey. It’s simply the administrative record from the perspective of the first Director in CIA statutory history.

On September 23, 1947, Hillenkoetter’s diary captures a directive so specific it should embarrass anyone still calling MJ-12 “myth” out of habit. He records an instruction coming from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to “bring papers at 11:00 AM Wednesday” with the accompanying reminder that the “Paper for White House [is] to be in by 9:AM.” That is hour-specific White House handling. That is not “routine work.” That is a very specific deadline the DCI had recorded verbatim the day before it happened.

“It happened” on Wednesday, September 24, 1947. The exact date universally identified as the Program’s genesis. At this point, the skeptic’s favorite move is to smirk and say “speculation,” or “coincidence,” or (the lamest) “but Rick Doty,” because it is easy to say and it saves you from doing the hard thing, which is explanation. There is no innocent explanation for this alignment. None. Full stop. But we know the skeptics will still try, so keep reading. The URL is right there. The diary is right there. You can verify every word yourself.

Then Hillenkoetter’s diary for the next day, September 24, delivers the line that ends the argument if you are serious about documents: “Director went to White House to discuss certain papers.” Not “a paper.” Not “an agenda.” Not “routine business,” but “certain papers.” In poker, this is what you call a “tell,” ie, when the opponent reveals more than he intends. The phrase “certain papers” matters because it is not how you describe ordinary administrative work. It is how you describe a sensitive subject when everyone in the loop already knows what it is and you are not going to spell it out, even in an internal log that was itself classified.

And notice the hypocrisy in how this always plays out. Skeptics love to demand “contemporaneous documentation” when the evidence is inconvenient to believers, but when the contemporaneous documentation is inconvenient to skeptics, suddenly words don’t mean anything. Suddenly “certain papers” is “nothing.” Suddenly a timed White House deadline is “routine.” Suddenly the DCI’s own phrasing is treated like it has no evidentiary value. You do not get to run that double standard and still call it skepticism. That is not skepticism. That is a pre-committed conclusion shopping for excuses.

No UFO researcher or AFOSI agent invented this. Hillenkoetter wrote it. The CIA preserved it. The U.S. government stamped it into the record and later scanned it and published it. The only “interpretation” happening here is the basic adult act of reading the plain text and noticing what it implies about sensitivity, timing, and coordination at the top.

Now look at what the diary says immediately afterward. Hillenkoetter is asked whether “12 copies” of the CIA paper will be enough for Friday, and he confirms, with a specific note that an additional copy will be prepared for Rear Admiral Souers. Twelve copies. Exactly the same number that later appears as the identifying signature of MJ-12, exactly the same numerical footprint skeptics love to sneer at as “bogus,” and yet here it is in the DCI’s own contemporaneous diary, on the exact day in question, in the middle of a White House-timed paper event. If you want to try luck, go buy a Powerball ticket. If you want to try real evidence, go read the diary for yourself and then explain why the DCI is ordering twelve controlled copies in the same sequence where he is carrying “certain papers” into the White House.

And the record gets worse for the “routine paperwork” crowd. On September 24, Hillenkoetter not only goes to the White House to discuss “certain papers.” Later that same day, in a conversation with John McCone, Hillenkoetter delays an internal CIA meeting specifically because, “as a result of his visit to White House – he wants to talk to Mr. Forrestal about it first.” Think about what you are being asked to believe if you still want to call this routine. Routine work does not move like this. Routine work does not require the Director of Central Intelligence to hit the White House, then pause internal movement until he can coordinate with the Secretary of Defense. That is precisely how sensitive programs of this importance operated in 1947: White House approval first, then National Military Establishment coordination second. When you see that sequence in writing, you are not looking at normal bureaucracy. You are looking at the birth of perhaps the most special compartment in American history.

Put the jigsaw pieces together and the pattern becomes difficult to deny without denying the English language itself. On 9/23 you have hour-specific White House handling instructions for “papers.” On 9/24 you have the DCI physically going to the White House to discuss “certain papers.” On the same day you have a controlled distribution count of twelve copies plus Souers. On the same day you have the DCI explicitly deferring internal action until he coordinates with Forrestal as a result of the White House visit earlier that exact day. The skeptics can insist this means nothing, but they cannot explain coherently why it looks exactly like a tightly compartmented control group coming alive in that moment.

And yes, the MJ-12 formation narrative claims that on 24 September 1947 Truman issued a presidential directive to Forrestal creating Majestic 12 and restricting “need to know” to a small set of principals, ie, the precise four people we now know attended that fateful White House meeting. The skeptic’s reflex is to demand a neon sign that reads “MAJESTIC TWELVE” or “TOP SECRET ALIEN PROGRAM” across the diary page. That is not how the real world works. Real sensitive programs do not announce themselves in plain language. Look at the Manhattan Project history for reference if you don’t believe my word. They show themselves in the administrative footprints: euphemisms, timed handling, limited distribution, and immediate coordination between the White House, the DCI, and SecDef. That is exactly what you are seeing here.

And this is why the “routine paperwork” refrain is not an argument. It is a dodge. And a lame one at that. If it were routine, why did he use the euphemism “certain papers”? If it were routine, why did they use the hour-specific White House deadline? If it were routine, why did they specifically limit the internal distribution count to twelve? If it were routine, why does the DCI delay responding to John McCone’s inquiry until after he speaks with Forrestal as a result of their White House meeting earlier that exact same day? “Routine” is a label, not an explanation. And “coincidence” is what you say when you would prefer to not use your critical thinking skills.

When you have contemporaneous, interlocking documents pointing to the same cluster of principals within the same 24-hour window, the correct word is corroboration. And when that corroboration comes contemporaneously from the government’s most powerful Intelligence official, preserved by the agency itself, the legal term of art is admissions. This paper trail effectively represents the CIA’s (or DCI’s, if that makes you feel better) own admissions because there was always going to be a paper trail here. Even though this contains zero UFO context and zero bias. It is simply the raw administrative truth of what the most powerful man in American intelligence was doing on the day in question.

So yes, the skeptics and bots will still show up and brigade and downvote and attack and try to insist the plain text does not say what it says. But wishful thinking does not change what the documents say. And what these documents say is simple: the DCI was under timed instructions to deliver papers to the White House on the morning of 9/24/47, he went to the White House that day to discuss “certain papers,” he supervised controlled distribution of twelve copies plus Souers, and he delayed internal CIA action until he could coordinate with Forrestal as a result of that White House visit. Those are not the footprints of bureaucratic routine stuff. Those are the footprints of a compartment coming to life.

The Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense wrote this script. Don’t take my word for it. Go and read the government’s own contemporaneous record for yourself and then explain, without any hypocrisy, why you treat “primary sources” as sacred only when they say what you want to hear.

Ps-the Shadow GHQ evidence is included at the very end here, with the link to the full massive pdf file from the Princeton University Library archives, for skeptics to see for themselves. This contemporaneous archival evidence merely reinforces the truth here, ie, that one month after 9/24, the “Shadow GHQ” was up and running, regardless of how that may make you feel. The pdf is ~200 megabytes, so it will take a while to download.

Also, this was written by a human, unlike some (all?) of the ragebot posts you’re about to see in this comment section.

by MAJESTICJEHOVAH

4 Comments

  1. MAJESTICJEHOVAH on

    If you’re going to challenge this, do it like an adult: on the text, in sequence, with an alternative explanation that actually fits all the facts at once. Drive-by sneers, “just routine,” and “coincidence” are not arguments. They’re tells.

    Here is what the record says, in plain English, from the DCI’s own contemporaneous diary.

    1. September 23, 1947: Hillenkoetter records a directive from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to “bring papers at 11:00 AM Wednesday,” with the added constraint that the “Paper for White House [is] to be in by 9:AM.” That’s recorded verbatim the day before the meeting.
    2. September 24, 1947: Hillenkoetter records: “Director went to White House to discuss certain papers.” Not “routine business.” Not “a briefing.” Not “a memo.” Certain papers. That phrase exists because everyone who needs to know already knows what it refers to, and the diary is not going to spell it out.
    3. Same sequence: controlled distribution is discussed: twelve copies—with an additional copy for Souers. If your position is that “twelve” is meaningless whenever it appears in MJ discourse, congratulations: you now have to explain why the DCI is controlling a “twelve copies + Souers” distribution in the same chain of entries as a White House-timed paper delivery and a White House visit about “certain papers.”
    4. Same day: Hillenkoetter delays internal CIA movement because “as a result of his visit to White House—he wants to talk to Mr. Forrestal about it first.” Read that again, slowly. White House first, then SecDef coordination, then internal action. That is exactly how sensitive programs move. Routine bureaucracy does not behave like that.

    So here’s the standard I’m holding commenters to:

    * If you want to claim “routine,” identify the specific routine process that (a) imposes a 9:00 AM White House deadline, (b) requires the DCI personally to carry papers to a specific 11:00 AM engagement, (c) is later described as “certain papers,” (d) triggers controlled distribution, and (e) causes the DCI to pause internal action until he coordinates with Forrestal as a direct result of the White House visit.
    * If you want to claim “coincidence,” explain why this cluster of details aligns precisely on 9/23–9/24 and why the DCI himself is the actor at every step. “Coincidence” is not an explanation; it’s a refusal to explain.

    And spare me the fake evidentiary BS. A certain genre of skeptic demands “contemporaneous documentation” right up until the moment contemporaneous documentation becomes inconvenient—then suddenly words don’t mean anything, specificity is “normal,” and the DCI’s own diary is treated like a game of Mad Libs.

    You don’t get to do that and call it skepticism. That’s just being hypocritical and applying a double standard.

    No one “invented” these entries. Hillenkoetter wrote them. The government preserved them. All I’m doing is reading what’s on the page and refusing to play the usual game where “primary sources” only count when they flatter your priors.

    If you disagree, fine. People will always have different opinions, and that is absolutely reasonable. That said, please bring a coherent alternative that fits all of it—timing, euphemism, distribution control, and immediate White House→Forrestal coordination—without handwaving. Otherwise you’re not actually rebutting the argument. And I will therefore not respond to comments that are basically just dramatic drive-by dismissals.

    P.S. The bots in the replies will be obvious—because bots don’t serious analysis, they do speculation and ad hominem attacks.

  2. Even if it did refer to the three secretaries, they have undersecretaries who need copies…

    This has nothing to do with MJ-12… and you blocked me.

    You can’t just keep looking for references to the number 12 and assume that proves MJ-12.

  3. Father_Chris_St_Mary on

    I challenge you to you use significantly less words going forward. This is long form content presented as long ass comments and it’s not good. Your entire first paragraph could be a sentence. 

    I like the meat of your content. Please stop serving gigantic trays of lettuce.